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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 These consolidated appeals are of great importance to 
the tax regimes of the United States and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands.  Residents of the Virgin Islands pay income taxes to 
the Virgin Islands Bureau of Internal Revenue (VIBIR) rather 
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than the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).  Appellants Richard 
and Lana Vento (the Ventos) filed a joint 2001 income tax 
return with the VIBIR.  Their three daughters also filed their 
2001 income tax returns with the VIBIR.  The United States 
claims that the Ventos and their daughters (collectively, 
Taxpayers) should have filed those returns with the IRS 
instead.  The proper tax jurisdiction depends on whether the 
Taxpayers were bona fide residents of the Virgin Islands as of 
December 31, 2001. 
I 
 A successful entrepreneur, Richard Vento co-founded 
a technology company called Objective Systems Integrators, 
Inc. (OSI).  When OSI was sold, the Ventos, their daughters, 
and various Vento-controlled entities realized $180 million in 
capital gains for the 2001 tax year.  Not surprisingly, this 
boon caused the Ventos to consult a financial professional to 
advise them regarding their capital gains. 
 Whatever advice the Ventos received and however 
they acted upon it, the Taxpayers have become embroiled in 
numerous tax disputes in various courts.
1
  The dispute at issue 
                                                 
1
 See, e.g., Mollison v. United States, 568 F.3d 1073 
(9th Cir. 2009); Mollison v. United States, 481 F.3d 119 (2d 
Cir. 2007); Richard Vento v. Comm’r, No. 18741-08 (Tax Ct. 
Sept. 18, 2012) (stipulated decision); Lana Vento v. Comm’r, 
No. 18742-08 (Tax Ct. Sept. 18, 2012) (stipulated decision); 
DTLV, LLC v. Comm’r, No. 742-09 (Tax Ct. filed Jan. 8, 
2009); DTDV, LLC v. Comm’r, No. 741-09 (Tax Ct. filed Jan. 
8, 2009); Gail Vento v. Comm’r, No. 23527-08 (Tax Ct. filed 
Sept. 24, 2008); Renee Vento v. Comm’r, 23540-08 (Tax Ct. 
filed Sept. 24, 2008); Mollison v. Comm’r, No. 23600-08 
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in the consolidated appeals now before us began in 2005, 
when the VIBIR issued Notices of Deficiency and Final 
Partnership Administrative Adjustments (FPAAs) to the 
Taxpayers and partnerships they controlled, assessing a 
deficiency and penalties of over $31 million against the 
Ventos and approximately $6.3 million against each of their 
three daughters.  The VIBIR also concluded that two Vento-
owned partnerships, VI Derivatives, LLC and VIFX, LLC,
2
 
were shams and disregarded them for tax purposes. 
 That same year, the IRS issued FPAAs to the 
Taxpayers that were nearly identical to those issued by the 
VIBIR.  Significantly, however, the IRS issued FPAAs to two 
other Vento-controlled partnerships—DTDV, LLC and 
                                                                                                             
(Tax Ct. filed Sept. 24, 2008); Richard Vento v. Comm’r, No. 
18740-08 (Tax Ct. filed July 31, 2008); Lana Vento v. 
Comm’r, No. 18739-08 (Tax Ct. filed July 31, 2008); Gail 
Vento v. Comm’r, No. 993-06 (Tax Ct. filed Jan. 12, 2006); 
Renee Vento v. Comm’r, No. 992-06 (Tax Ct. filed Jan. 12, 
2006); Lana Vento v. Comm’r, No. 991-06 (Tax Ct. filed Jan. 
12, 2006); Richard Vento v. Comm’r, No. 990-06 (Tax Ct. 
filed Jan. 12, 2006).  Several of these cases remain inactive 
pending our decision in this case. 
2
 Unless they elect to be treated as corporations, 
limited liability companies are treated as partnerships for tax 
purposes.  See 26 U.S.C. §§ 702, 761(a); Historic Boardwalk 
Hall, LLC v. Comm’r, 694 F.3d 425, 429 n.1 (3d Cir. 2012).  
For the sake of simplicity, we will refer to the Vento LLCs 
subject to FPAAs as partnerships. 
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DTLV, LLC—that were unchallenged by the VIBIR.3  
Consequently, the IRS assessed deficiencies and penalties 
against the Taxpayers that totaled over $9 million more than 
those assessed by the VIBIR. 
 The Taxpayers challenged the VIBIR‘s and IRS‘s 
Notices of Deficiency and FPAAs in several separate 
proceedings in the District Court of the Virgin Islands.  The 
United States moved to intervene in the cases between the 
Taxpayers and the VIBIR, arguing that the Taxpayers should 
have filed and paid their 2001 taxes to the IRS instead of the 
VIBIR because they were not bona fide residents of the 
Virgin Islands.
4
  Following the intervention of the United 
States, the cases were consolidated in the District Court, 
which had subject matter jurisdiction under 48 U.S.C. 
§ 1612(a). 
 In June 2010, the District Court conducted a bench 
trial.  The sole issue at trial was whether the Taxpayers were 
bona fide residents of the Virgin Islands as of December 31, 
2001.  The District Court held that they were not, and the 
Taxpayers, joined by the VIBIR, appealed.  We have 
                                                 
3
 These two FPAAs are the subject of litigation in the 
U.S. Tax Court that has remained dormant since August 
2012.  See DTLV, LLC v. Comm’r, No. 742-09 (Tax Ct. filed 
Jan. 8, 2009); DTDV, LLC v. Comm’r, No. 741-09 (Tax Ct. 
filed Jan. 8, 2009). 
4
 Except where otherwise indicated, ―Virgin Islands‖ 
refers only to the United States Virgin Islands. 
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appellate jurisdiction over the consolidated appeals under 28 
U.S.C § 1291.
5
 
II 
 The parties largely agree on the facts and the 
governing law.  Their arguments revolve around a few 
disputed facts and their competing applications of the law to 
the facts.  Our review of the facts adopts those found by the 
District Court, except where we indicate otherwise. 
A 
 Richard and Lana Vento are married and filed a joint 
2001 tax return.  From 1995 through 2000, the Ventos lived 
in Incline Village, Nevada, on the north shore of Lake Tahoe.  
That home was fully furnished and contained more than 
$500,000 worth of artwork.  In 2000 and 2001, the Ventos 
also owned two homes in Hawaii, two homes on the south 
shore of Lake Tahoe in California, and a condominium in 
Utah.  The Ventos kept approximately twenty automobiles in 
Nevada and California. 
 The Ventos have three daughters, all of whom were 
adults in 2001.  In early 2001, the Ventos‘ eldest daughter, 
Nicole Mollison, lived in a separate home in Incline Village 
                                                 
5
 The VIBIR attempted to appeal the final order filed 
in the litigation between VI Derivatives, LLC and the United 
States, No. 3:06-cv-00012.  Although the VIBIR was not a 
party to that case, VI Derivatives, LLC also appealed the final 
order, and its appeal is the basis of our jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
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with her husband and three children.  The Ventos‘ second 
child, Gail, lived in Boulder, Colorado, while their youngest 
daughter, Renee, lived in San Diego, California.  The Ventos 
also maintained a family office in Incline Village. 
 After the sale of OSI, the Ventos and their daughters 
took a family vacation in March 2001 during which they 
chartered a yacht and visited approximately ten of the British 
and U.S. Virgin Islands.  Prior to this trip, no member of the 
Vento family had ever been to the Virgin Islands or 
considered moving there. 
 Soon after cruising the islands, the Ventos began 
searching for residential property in the Virgin Islands.  Their 
daughters were not involved in the search.  In May 2001, the 
Ventos (through a limited liability company they controlled) 
contracted to buy Estate Frydendahl, a residential property on 
St. Thomas, for $7.2 million.  Estate Frydendahl—which 
included a five-bedroom main house and several outlying 
buildings, including three two-bedroom cottages with 
kitchens—was sold furnished, and the transaction closed on 
August 1, 2001.  At the time of purchase, the sellers were 
living in some of the outlying buildings, but the main house 
was vacant. 
 Once the Ventos had Estate Frydendahl under contract, 
they hired professional home inspector Adrian Bishop to 
inspect the property.  Bishop‘s report concluded that Estate 
Frydendahl was a ―magnificent house and property,‖ and was 
―substantially built, but . . . suffering from deferred 
maintenance.‖  Bishop summarized his findings: 
There are no major structural deficiencies on 
the property.  There are some places where 
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deficiencies exist, and all the structures suffer 
from deferred maintenance to varying degrees.  
The electrical system has many deficiencies, the 
plumbing system is quite sophisticated but 
suffering from 46 (or so) years of existence, and 
the roofs are in various states of repair. 
Based on Bishop‘s report, the Ventos‘ attorney concluded that 
there were ―$50,000 to $64,000 worth of items which . . . 
should be addressed immediately upon closing.‖  Most of that 
sum was attributable to repairs to the roofs, gutters, and 
electrical system.  As a result of Bishop‘s report, the purchase 
price of Estate Frydendahl was reduced to $6.75 million. 
 In addition to the repairs recommended by Bishop, the 
Ventos desired other significant improvements to Estate 
Frydendahl.  At trial, Richard testified that, although his wife 
wanted to keep ―the rock walls and the lignum vitae floor,‖ 
they ―had to redo all the rest of it‖ including the ―roof, . . . air 
conditioning, electricity, plumbing.  Everything.‖  The Ventos 
ultimately spent more than $20 million over and above the 
original purchase price improving Estate Frydendahl. 
 In November 2001, Richard retained a general 
contractor, RR Caribbean, Inc., to make improvements.  
However, their agreement did not specify any particular work 
to be done.  Rather, it merely created ―a baseline contractual 
relationship.‖  The November agreement had an initial term 
of two years and would renew annually unless either party 
cancelled it in writing.  RR Caribbean performed ―some 
minor construction work‖ in 2001, but major work did not 
begin until 2002. 
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 The Ventos hoped that renovations to Estate 
Frydendahl could be completed in time for them to move in 
by Christmas 2001.  Progress was slow, however, and the 
Ventos grew frustrated.  Consequently, in the late fall of 
2001, Lana Vento brought in Dave Thomas, a construction 
manager whom she had previously hired to work in Hawaii, 
to supervise the project.  In December 2001, Thomas 
travelled to the Virgin Islands and concluded that the main 
house at Estate Frydendahl was ―50 percent livable, where 
you could live there.  But the normal amenities did not work 
properly or consistently, including water, electricity.‖  In 
particular, Thomas testified that, although the main house 
―was livable, to the point where you had electricity, lights, 
stove,‖ the entrance gate did not work, the house was very 
warm because the ceiling fans and air conditioning did not 
work, the dock was dilapidated and very dangerous, there was 
no source of potable water because the water purification 
system did not work, some of the toilets did not work, and the 
power supply was inadequate.  Thomas also testified that the 
three outlying cottages were ―pretty much, flat out‖ unlivable.  
Thomas began working on improving Estate Frydendahl in 
January 2002.  He stayed there until ―Christmas of 2003,‖ at 
which point the Ventos ―had their whole family and friends‖ 
there and ―had things up and running.‖  Nevertheless, work 
on Estate Frydendahl continued for six more years. 
 In August 2001, the Ventos began planning a 
Christmas party at Estate Frydendahl.  Lana furnished certain 
rooms and ordered a pool table.  She also hired a designer to 
decorate both the Estate and her Incline Village house for 
Christmas.  For the Christmas party itself, the Ventos invited 
seventeen family members to Estate Frydendahl.  They also 
paid for Lana‘s brother, Raleigh Pribanich, and his family to 
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fly from California to St. Thomas.  Between December 25, 
2001, and January 1, 2002, Pribanich took many photographs 
of the Vento family members and their guests.
6
  Following 
the Christmas party, the Ventos‘ designer took down the 
decorations and moved the furniture from the main house to 
one of the cottages. 
 Although Nicole Mollison returned to Nevada with her 
husband and children on December 26, 2001, the other Vento 
family members and guests stayed on St. Thomas through 
New Year‘s Eve.  Afterwards, the Ventos began to split their 
time between the Virgin Islands and the mainland.  Lana 
visited the Virgin Islands most frequently because she was 
overseeing the construction efforts at Estate Frydendahl.  She 
would spend between one and six weeks at a time there, then 
leave for another six weeks.  During the first five months of 
2002, Richard spent 35 days in St. Thomas, 23 days in San 
Francisco, and 41 days in Nevada.  Richard also spent 
considerable time in Hawaii in 2002.  He filed his 2001 tax 
return from Hawaii and requested Honolulu as the place of 
trial in a separate legal dispute with the IRS. 
 In addition to purchasing Estate Frydendahl, Richard 
became interested in participating in the Virgin Islands‘s 
Economic Development Program (EDP), which offers very 
favorable tax treatment to certain approved Virgin Islands 
companies.  See 29 V.I.C. § 713b.  Richard received financial 
                                                 
6
 Because of the financial ties between the Ventos and 
the Pribanichs and the circumstances surrounding the 
photographs, the District Court concluded that several of 
them were taken for the purpose of portraying the Ventos as 
Virgin Islands residents. 
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and legal advice regarding the EDP and, between May 2001 
and August 2001, he founded three companies in the Virgin 
Islands: (1) Virgin Islands Microsystems, which was to 
perform nanotechnology research; (2) Edge Access, which 
was to build internet access devices; and (3) VI Derivatives, 
LLC, which the VIBIR and IRS later deemed a sham 
partnership.  Ultimately, only Virgin Islands Microsystems 
was approved to receive EDP benefits, and that approval did 
not occur until 2002. 
 The Ventos obtained Virgin Islands driver‘s licenses 
and registered to vote there in the fall of 2001.  However, 
they moved none of their art collection and ―very little‖ of 
their personal property to St. Thomas.  Nor did the Ventos 
maintain a post office box in St. Thomas, despite the fact that 
mail service was unavailable at Estate Frydendahl.  The 
Ventos did, however, create a post office box for their 
business, which they listed as their billing address when they 
set up utilities at Estate Frydendahl. 
 Throughout the early 2000s, the Ventos also engaged 
in real estate transactions on the mainland.  In October 2000, 
they listed the Incline Village house for sale, contingent upon 
their purchase of a 2.2-acre property containing an old cottage 
on the north shore of Lake Tahoe.  In May 2001, the Ventos 
purchased that Lake Tahoe property for $13.5 million.  They 
planned to build a new home containing a 22-car garage and a 
tennis court there, but that plan was ultimately abandoned in 
2007. 
 As of December 2001, the Ventos had not sold the 
Incline Village house.  They calculated that they would save 
money by donating the house to charity and utilizing the tax 
deduction, rather than selling it.  Consequently, on December 
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28, 2001, the Ventos purported to donate the Incline Village 
house by quitclaim deed to the Dick & Lana Charitable 
Support Organization (Support Organization), a Virgin 
Islands organization.
7
 
 The Ventos purchased an insurance policy in their 
names on the Incline Village house for calendar years 2001 
and 2002, and more than $3 million of their personal property 
remained there.  The Incline Village house was finally sold in 
March 2002. 
 In April 2002, the Ventos purchased a furnished two-
bedroom condominium in Incline Village.  They purchased it 
in the name of the Support Organization and then leased it to 
themselves for $3,500 per month for three years, though they 
paid no rent for the first four months of the lease term.  In 
April 2002, the Support Organization held a meeting, the 
minutes of which stated: ―Will live in the Condo until the new 
house is built.‖  The District Court interpreted that line to 
mean that the Ventos would live in the Incline Village 
condominium until the planned Lake Tahoe house was built. 
B 
 As of December 31, 2001, the three Vento daughters 
were all adults.  The eldest, Nicole, was at all relevant times 
                                                 
7
 At the time of this purported donation, the Support 
Organization did not actually exist because its formation 
documents were not signed until March 2002.  The legitimacy 
of the donation is currently the subject of other litigation 
between the Ventos and the IRS.  See Richard Vento v. 
Comm’r, No. 990-06 (Tax Ct. filed Jan. 12, 2006). 
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married to Peter Mollison.  In 2001, Nicole and Peter were 
the parents of three children, though they adopted a fourth 
child in 2003.  In 1995, the Mollisons moved into a home in 
Nevada that was titled to Nicole Vento, LLC.  They hired 
contractors to remodel that home during 2000, 2001, and 
2002.  In 2006, the Mollisons moved to a new home in San 
Anselmo, California, where they were living as of February 
2011. 
 In 2001, the Mollisons visited St. Thomas three times, 
each time staying at Estate Frydendahl and engaging ―in 
tourist activities.‖  The Mollisons never moved any of their 
pets or personal property to St. Thomas.  Nicole never 
obtained a Virgin Islands driver‘s license or voter registration.  
She listed her address on her 2001 tax return as a mail drop in 
St. Thomas.  Although Nicole testified that she moved into a 
two-room suite at Estate Frydendahl, the District Court found 
her testimony ―not credible given her evasive demeanor on 
cross-examination, her family‘s continuing ties to Nevada 
. . . , and the lack of safe and comfortable accommodations 
for the Mollison family at [Estate Frydendahl].‖ 
 In 2003, Nicole studied to become a teacher at Sierra 
Nevada College in Incline Village, Nevada.  She eventually 
became licensed to teach in Nevada and California, but not in 
the Virgin Islands.  From 2000 through the 2005–06 school 
year, all of Nicole‘s children attended school in Nevada, 
although they were enrolled in a St. Thomas school for a few 
weeks in 2004.  During their 2003 adoption proceedings, the 
Mollisons swore under oath that they were residents of 
Washoe County, Nevada.  Nicole did not tell the Nevada 
court or social worker that she had a Virgin Islands residence. 
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 The Ventos‘ second daughter, Gail, was enrolled as a 
full-time student at the University of Colorado at Boulder 
from 1998 until December 2002.  In 2000, Gail bought a 
2,800-square foot house in Boulder, where she lived with her 
boyfriend, Eric Walker, for the remainder of her college 
career.  Gail visited St. Thomas twice in 2001—for the family 
cruise in March and for the Christmas party—during which 
she stayed in a bedroom in the main house at Estate 
Frydendahl and engaged in ―tourist-type activities.‖  Other 
than some clothing, Gail brought no personal property to St. 
Thomas. 
 By the end of 2001, Gail had neither obtained a Virgin 
Islands driver‘s license nor registered to vote there.  In May 
2003, Gail purchased a house in Nevada.  In September of 
that year, she and Eric Walker married.  Following their 
marriage, they moved into one of the cottages at Estate 
Frydendahl, where they lived until they moved into a new 
home on St. Thomas in 2008.  At trial, Gail testified that she 
moved to the Virgin Islands in 2002. 
 The youngest Vento daughter, Renee, graduated from 
San Diego State University in June 2001.  After graduation, 
she took a trip to the Virgin Islands and stayed at a hotel on 
St. Thomas.  Renee traveled again to St. Thomas in 
September 2001, when she stayed in a room in the main 
house at Estate Frydendahl.  She also traveled to St. Thomas 
for the Christmas party, but returned to Nevada in early 
January 2002.  The only personal property Renee had in St. 
Thomas were ―easily movable items,‖ such as clothing, 
camera equipment, and a laptop. 
 At the end of 2001, Renee had neither obtained a 
Virgin Islands driver‘s license nor registered to vote there.  
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She obtained a Virgin Islands driver‘s license in March 2002 
but kept her Nevada license as well.  At some point, Renee 
lost her Virgin Islands driver‘s license but did not replace it.  
In 2005, she renewed her Nevada driver‘s license.  Renee 
never opened a bank account in the Virgin Islands. 
 From summer 2001 until spring 2002, Renee lived at 
Lake Tahoe and was employed in her family‘s home office, 
for which she was paid around $14 per hour to perform 
administrative tasks.  In January 2002, Renee applied to the 
Brooks Institute of Photography in California, listing her 
address as a post office box in Nevada.  She enrolled at the 
Brooks Institute in 2002 and lived in California. 
III 
 Having described the procedural history and facts of 
these appeals, we turn to the applicable law.  Our exposition 
begins with an overview of the special relationship between 
the Virgin Islands and the United States. 
A 
 The United States acquired the Virgin Islands from the 
King of Denmark in 1916.  See 48 U.S.C. § 1541.  After the 
acquisition, the local tax laws remained in force until 
Congress enacted the Naval Service Appropriations Act of 
1921, currently codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1397.  See Bizcap, 
Inc. v. Olive, 892 F.2d 1163, 1165 (3d Cir. 1989) (reviewing 
history).  That statute provides: 
The income-tax laws in force in the United 
States of America and those which may 
hereafter be enacted shall be held to be likewise 
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in force in the Virgin Islands of the United 
States, except that the proceeds of such taxes 
shall be paid into the treasuries of said islands. 
48 U.S.C. § 1397.  This statutory scheme is known as the 
―mirror code,‖ under which the Internal Revenue Code is 
applied to the Virgin Islands merely by substituting ―Virgin 
Islands‖ for ―United States‖ throughout.  See Bizcap, 892 
F.2d at 1165; Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Wheatley, 430 
F.2d 973, 975 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1970). 
 According to this statutory scheme, Virgin Islands 
residents are subject to different tax filing requirements than 
other United States citizens.  Under the version of 26 U.S.C. 
§ 932(c) applicable in these appeals, taxpayers who are ―bona 
fide resident[s] of the Virgin Islands at the close of the 
taxable year‖8 are required to ―file an income tax return for 
the taxable year with the Virgin Islands.‖  26 U.S.C. § 932(c) 
(1986).  If the taxpayer ―on his return of income tax to the 
Virgin Islands, reports income from all sources and identifies 
the source of each item shown on such return‖ and ―fully pays 
his tax liability . . . to the Virgin Islands with respect to such 
income,‖ then ―for purposes of calculating income tax 
liability to the United States, gross income shall not include 
any amount included in gross income on such return.‖  26 
U.S.C. § 932(c)(4).  Thus, bona fide Virgin Islands residents 
who fully report their income and satisfy their obligations to 
                                                 
8
 In 2004, § 932(c) was amended to require taxpayers 
to be ―bona fide resident[s] of the Virgin Islands during the 
entire taxable year.‖  26 U.S.C. § 932(c)(4)(A) (2004).  That 
amendment does not apply to these appeals because it was not 
retroactive. 
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the VIBIR do not pay taxes to the IRS.  See Abramson 
Enters., Inc. v. Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 994 F.2d 140, 144 (3d 
Cir. 1993).  This is true even if the bona fide Virgin Islands 
resident is also a resident of the mainland United States.  As 
we will discuss later, taxpayers may have multiple 
residencies, and § 932(c) requires only that taxpayers have a 
bona fide residency in the Virgin Islands, not that they lack 
bona fide residencies elsewhere. 
 Although Virgin Islands residents who satisfy the 
requirements of § 932(c) pay their taxes to the VIBIR rather 
than the IRS, the Virgin Islands‘s ability to engage in tax 
competition with the United States is limited by 26 U.S.C. 
§ 934, which provides that ―[t]ax liability incurred to the 
Virgin Islands pursuant to [the mirror code] . . . shall not be 
reduced or remitted in any way, directly or indirectly, whether 
by grant, subsidy, or other similar payment, by any law 
enacted in the Virgin Islands, except to the extent provided in 
subsection (b).‖  26 U.S.C. § 934(a).9  Subsection (b), in turn, 
provides a limited exception for Virgin Islands residents‘ tax 
liability ―attributable to income derived from sources within 
the Virgin Islands or income effectively connected with the 
conduct of a trade or business within the Virgin Islands.‖  26 
U.S.C. § 934(b).  Thus, Virgin Islands residents pay the same 
taxes at the same rates on their non-Virgin Islands-source 
income as non-Virgin Islands residents, though the taxes on 
Virgin Islands-source income may differ.  See United States 
                                                 
9
 26 U.S.C. § 934 was cosmetically amended in 2004.  
Compare 26 U.S.C. § 934(b)(4) (1986), with 26 U.S.C. 
§ 934(b)(4) (2004).  Because the 2004 amendments are not 
retroactive, the 1986 version of § 934 applies in this case. 
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v. Auffenberg, 2008 WL 4115997, at *2 (D.V.I. Aug. 26, 
2008). 
 As authorized by 26 U.S.C. § 934(b), the Virgin 
Islands enacted the Economic Development Program to 
promote local economic activity.  Pursuant to the EDP, bona 
fide residents of the Virgin Islands can receive a 90% tax 
reduction on certain approved Virgin Islands-source income.  
See 29 V.I.C. § 708(b) (bona fide residency requirement); 29 
V.I.C. § 713b (income tax reduction). 
B 
 The meaning of residency ―may vary according to 
context.‖  Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 330 (1983).  In 
the tax context, residency requires ―far less than domicile.‖  
Sochurek v. Comm’r, 300 F.2d 34, 38 (7th Cir. 1962); see 
also Croyle v. Comm’r, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 339 (1980) (―[T]he 
citizen need not be domiciled in a foreign country . . . in order 
to be classed as a resident for Federal income tax purposes.‖).  
Unlike domicile, residency does not require ―an intent to 
make a fixed and permanent home.‖10  Sochurek, 300 F.2d at 
                                                 
10
 ―‗[R]esidence‘ generally requires both physical 
presence and an intention to remain.‖  Martinez, 461 U.S. at 
330.  In the tax context, however, although courts consider 
intent as a factor in determining residency, they are divided 
over whether intent is absolutely required for residency.  
Compare Weible v. United States, 244 F.2d 158, 163 (9th Cir. 
1957) (―‗Residence‘ simply requires bodily presence as an 
inhabitant in a given place.‖), with Bergersen v. Comm’r, 109 
F.3d 56, 61 (1st Cir. 1997) (―‗[R]esidence‘ implies that the 
individual has established his or her residential base, planning 
to remain indefinitely or at least for a substantial period.‖).  In 
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38.  Furthermore, while a person can have only one domicile, 
he can be a resident of multiple places at the same time.  See 
Downs v. Comm’r, 166 F.2d 504, 508 (9th Cir. 1948); see 
also Martinez, 461 U.S. at 339–40 (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(noting the rule that an individual can have ―but one domicile 
and several residences‖); Hill v. City of Scranton, 411 F.3d 
118, 128 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 Although residency requires far fewer contacts than 
domicile, a bona fide resident still must be more than a 
transient or sojourner.  See Sochurek, 300 F.2d at 38.  ―[M]ere 
physical presence in a foreign country is not sufficient to 
establish bona fide residency.‖  Croyle, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 
339. 
 The District Court, at the parties‘ behest, applied 
Sochurek to this dispute, and we will do so as well.  Courts 
applying Sochurek consider the following factors to 
determine whether a taxpayer‘s claimed residency is bona 
fide: 
(1) intention of the taxpayer; 
                                                                                                             
Sochurek, which the parties and the District Court all agreed 
provides the applicable test, the Seventh Circuit considered 
the ―intention of the taxpayer‖ as a factor in determining 
residency, but did not suggest that such intent was a 
prerequisite.  300 F.2d at 38.  Because we conclude that the 
Ventos had the intent to reside in the Virgin Islands on 
December 31, 2001, we need not decide whether intent is 
always required for a taxpayer to prove residency. 
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(2) establishment of his home temporarily in the 
foreign country for an indefinite period;
11
 
(3) participation in the activities of his chosen 
community on social and cultural levels, 
identification with the daily lives of the people 
and, in general, assimilation into the foreign 
environment; 
(4) physical presence in the foreign country 
consistent with his employment; 
(5) nature, extent and reasons for temporary 
absences from his temporary foreign home; 
(6) assumption of economic burdens and 
payment of taxes to the foreign country; 
(7) status of resident contrasted to that of 
transient or sojourner; 
(8) treatment accorded his income tax status by 
his employer; 
(9) marital status and residence of his family; 
(10) nature and duration of his employment; 
whether his assignment abroad could be 
                                                 
11
 Obviously, the Virgin Islands is not a ―foreign 
country,‖ but, as the parties and the District Court agreed, 
Sochurek applies nonetheless.  See Bergersen, 109 F.3d at 61 
(citing Sochurek in discussing whether taxpayers were bona 
fide Puerto Rico residents). 
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promptly accomplished within a definite or 
specified time; 
(11) good faith in making his trip abroad; 
whether for purpose of tax evasion. 
Sochurek, 300 F.2d at 38.  ―While all such factors may not be 
present in every situation, those appropriate should be 
properly considered and weighed.‖  Id. 
 The eleven Sochurek factors can be grouped into four 
broad categories for purposes of our analysis.  First, we will 
consider the taxpayer‘s intent, which encompasses factors (1), 
(2), (7), (10), and (11).  A taxpayer‘s intent to remain in a 
place for an indefinite or at least substantial period of time 
will support a finding of residency in that place.  See 
Bergersen v. Comm’r, 109 F.3d 56, 61 (1st Cir. 1997).  This 
intent can be evidenced by the establishment of a long-term 
home, a long-term employment assignment, or other evidence 
indicating an intent to become more than a mere transient or 
sojourner.  See Sochurek, 300 F.2d at 38.  On the other hand, 
if a taxpayer has only temporary housing and employment 
arrangements in the claimed place of residency, and an intent 
to depart at the end of those arrangements, bona fide 
residency probably will not be found.  See id. at 38–39 
(discussing ―war-worker‖ cases in which courts have rejected 
claims of bona fide residency for taxpayers who went abroad 
―for some specific purpose incident to the war effort,‖ whose 
employment was ―limited by contract or by the duration of 
the war,‖ and who worked and lived on military bases, where 
their movements and interactions with the local population 
were ―severely circumscribed‖).  In addition, a taxpayer‘s 
intent to engage in unlawful tax evasion will counsel against a 
finding of bona fide residency because it indicates that the 
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taxpayer does not in good faith intend to become a resident, 
but rather intends to perpetrate a sham.  See id.  As we shall 
discuss in more detail, however, a taxpayer‘s lawful tax 
avoidance motives will not weigh against finding bona fide 
residency. 
 Second, we consider the taxpayer‘s physical presence, 
which encompasses Sochurek factors (2), (4), (5), and (7).  A 
taxpayer‘s sustained physical presence in a place will support 
a finding of bona fide residency there.  See id.  On the other 
hand, extensive absences will negate a finding of bona fide 
residency, unless those absences are justified by good-faith 
reasons, such as the travel requirements of the taxpayer‘s 
profession.  See id. at 39.  In addition to the extent of the 
taxpayer‘s physical presence, the nature of that presence is 
relevant as well.  A taxpayer who is present at a home he has 
established and maintains year-round will have a stronger 
claim to bona fide residency than one who is present without 
such a home.  See id. 
 Third, we consider the taxpayer‘s social, family, and 
professional relationships, which implicate Sochurek factors 
(3) and (9).  A taxpayer‘s claim of bona fide residency will be 
supported if he assimilates into the locale by building social 
and professional ties with the local community.  See id. at 38.  
The same is true if his spouse and any dependent family 
members also live there.  See id. at 38–39.  On the other hand, 
if a taxpayer has not assimilated into the claimed place of 
residency and maintains most of his social, family, and 
professional relationships elsewhere, that would counsel 
against a finding of bona fide residency. 
 Finally, we consider the taxpayer‘s own 
representations, which implicate Sochurek factors (6) and (8).  
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If a taxpayer self-identifies as a resident of a place, by paying 
taxes there and observing the other economic burdens, civic 
obligations, and legal formalities of residency, that would 
support a finding of bona fide residency.
12
  On the other hand, 
a taxpayer who does not self-identify as a resident will have a 
hard time proving he is one. 
C 
 We review the District Court‘s factual findings, 
including its credibility determinations, for clear error.  See 
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985); 
Gordon v. Lewistown Hosp., 423 F.3d 184, 201 (3d Cir. 
2005).  Under that standard, we may overturn the District 
Court‘s findings only if ―we are left with a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed.‖  Gordon, 423 
F.3d at 201. 
 We review the District Court‘s ultimate residency 
determination de novo because it ―is a conclusion of law or at 
least a determination of a mixed question of law and fact.‖  
Jones v. Comm’r, 927 F.2d 849, 852 (5th Cir. 1991); see also 
Bergersen, 109 F.3d at 61 (residency determination is ―mixed 
question of fact and law‖); Sochurek, 300 F.2d at 37 (tax 
                                                 
12
 Likewise, if the taxpayer‘s employer treats him as a 
resident of a place, that too would support a finding of bona 
fide residency.  See Sochurek, 300 F.2d at 38.  However, that 
factor is not implicated here because the Ventos do not have 
employers. 
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court‘s ―conclusion of residency is reviewable by this court as 
a question of law‖).13 
 
                                                 
13
 The United States, citing Bergersen, argues that the 
residency question is a mixed question of fact and law and 
that the District Court‘s determination is entitled to ―some 
deference.‖  See Bergersen, 109 F.3d at 61.  Deference to the 
District Court is appropriate in mixed question cases where 
answering the question will have little precedential value, 
where the question does not require much legal reasoning 
once the applicable test is stated, or where witness credibility 
is determinative.  See United States v. Brown, 631 F.3d 638, 
643–44 (3d Cir. 2011).  In the consolidated cases before us, 
our decision will likely carry significant precedential value 
for other taxpayers, particularly other taxpayers who moved 
to the Virgin Islands prior to 2004.  See McHenry v. Comm’r, 
677 F.3d 214, 215–16 (4th Cir. 2012) (discussing IRS 
challenges to the residencies of taxpayers who claimed to 
have moved to the Virgin Islands prior to 2004).  In addition, 
our few disagreements with the District Court are based not 
on its credibility determinations or factual findings, but rather 
on its legal analysis—for example, it required more physical 
presence of the Taxpayers than is appropriate under § 932(c) 
and placed undue weight on their tax avoidance motivations.  
Therefore, deference to the District Court is not appropriate in 
this case.  We note that most of the other courts of appeals 
reviewing tax residency determinations have also reviewed 
those determinations de novo.  See, e.g., Jones, 927 F.2d at 
852; Sochurek, 300 F.2d at 37; Weible, 244 F.2d at 161; 
Comm’r v. Swent, 155 F.2d 513, 514 (4th Cir. 1946).  But see 
Bergersen, 109 F.3d at 61. 
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IV 
 The Taxpayers and the VIBIR raise two broad 
challenges to the District Court‘s analysis and several 
arguments against the District Court‘s weighing of the 
evidence.  We will first address the global challenges and 
then weigh the evidence de novo using the Sochurek factors. 
A 
 The Taxpayers first argue that, because Congress set a 
lower bar for proving Virgin Islands residency under 26 
U.S.C. § 932 than proving foreign residency generally under 
26 U.S.C. § 911, the District Court should have applied a 
standard more favorable to them in its residency analysis. 
 It is true that the pre-2004 version of § 932 is easier to 
satisfy than § 911.  Under § 911, a taxpayer seeking to prove 
foreign residency must prove, ―to the satisfaction of the 
Secretary,‖ that: (1) he was a bona fide resident of a foreign 
country for the entire taxable year; and (2) that his ―tax 
home‖ is in that foreign country.  26 U.S.C. § 911(d)(1).  By 
contrast, § 932 merely requires that a taxpayer be a bona fide 
resident of the Virgin Islands at the end of the taxable year 
and contains no requirement that a taxpayer‘s ―tax home‖ be 
in the Virgin Islands or that the taxpayer prove his case ―to 
the satisfaction of the Secretary.‖  See id. § 932(c) (1986). 
 Consistent with the text of § 932, the Taxpayers need 
not prove that they were residents of the Virgin Islands for all 
of 2001 or that they had their tax home in the Virgin Islands.  
Nonetheless, the Taxpayers still have to prove that they were 
bona fide residents of the Virgin Islands on December 31, 
2001.  The fact that § 932 is easier to satisfy than § 911 in 
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three particular respects does not mean that § 932 is not 
susceptible to analysis pursuant to the Sochurek factors.  The 
Taxpayers themselves argued for the application of Sochurek 
in the District Court.  We too will follow Sochurek and apply 
the same standard to the Taxpayers‘ Virgin Islands residency 
claims as we would apply to any other claim of foreign 
residency under § 911. 
 The Taxpayers next argue that the United States 
should bear the burden of proof.  This argument was waived 
because it was not raised before the District Court.  See 
Belitskus v. Pizzingrilli, 343 F.3d 632, 645 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 The Taxpayers and the VIBIR argue that the issue was 
not waived, pointing to a lone statement by the VIBIR‘s trial 
counsel: ―I submit that the U.S. had a burden to establish the 
residence in the U.S. that the Ventos were residing in, and at 
the latter half of 2001, and they failed to do so.‖  App. 1273.  
However, because a person can be a resident of more than 
one place at the same time, see Downs, 166 F.2d at 508, the 
argument that the United States had to show that the Ventos 
had a specific residence within the mainland is different from 
the argument that the United States was required to show that 
the Ventos did not reside in the Virgin Islands.  Indeed, the 
VIBIR‘s trial briefs seem to acknowledge that the Ventos had 
the burden of proof.  See VIBIR Memorandum of Fact and 
Law on the Issue of Residency at 28, VI Derivatives, LLC v. 
United States, No. 3:06-cv-00012-JRS-RM (D.V.I. May 17, 
2010), ECF No. 75 (―The taxpayer must establish that he had 
an intention to be more than a mere transient or sojourner.‖). 
 The Taxpayers also argue that the burden of proof 
argument was not waived because it was ―inherent in the 
parties‘ positions throughout th[e] case.‖  See Huber v. 
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Taylor, 469 F.3d 67, 74–75 (3d Cir. 2006).  In Huber, we 
held that the plaintiffs did not waive a choice of law issue 
because it was ―inherent in the parties‘ positions‖ when the 
plaintiffs and the defendants were arguing for the application 
of the law of different states.  Id. at 75.  In that case, the fact 
that the parties were arguing for the application of different 
laws necessarily implied that they were raising a choice of 
law question.  By contrast, the parties‘ disagreement about the 
Ventos‘ residency here does not necessarily imply a 
disagreement about the burden of proof.  See Donahue v. 
Consol. Rail Corp., 224 F.3d 226, 230 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding 
burden of proof argument waived). 
 The Taxpayers also argue that we should exercise our 
discretion to hear the burden of proof issue because it is a 
pure question of law.  See Huber, 469 F.3d at 74–75.  We 
―may consider a pure question of law even if not raised below 
where refusal to reach the issue would result in a miscarriage 
of justice or where the issue‘s resolution is of public 
importance.‖  Id. (emphasis added).  Here, the parties are 
sophisticated and were represented by able counsel.  
Moreover, the burden of proof issue is immaterial to our 
ultimate ruling.  Therefore, no miscarriage of justice or issue 
of public importance is implicated and we will not exercise 
our discretion to adjudicate the issue.
14
 
                                                 
14
 The VIBIR also argues that the District Court 
violated Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2) by refusing to 
consider evidence of the Taxpayers‘ post-2001 activities.  But 
it has failed to cite to a single instance where the District 
Court sustained an objection to evidence of the Taxpayers‘ 
post-2001 activities.  Therefore, the VIBIR‘s Rule 404(b)(2) 
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B 
 Having rejected the Taxpayers‘ global challenges to 
the District Court‘s analysis, we turn to their arguments 
against the District Court‘s weighing of the evidence.  We 
begin by applying the Sochurek factors to Richard and Lana 
Vento.
15
 
1. Intent
16
 
                                                                                                             
argument is really a challenge to the District Court‘s 
weighing of the evidence. 
15
 Because 26 U.S.C. § 932(c) applies not only to bona 
fide residents of the Virgin Islands, but also to individuals 
filing jointly with bona fide residents of the Virgin Islands, a 
finding that either Richard or Lana was a bona fide resident 
authorizes them to file their joint return with the VIBIR in 
lieu of the IRS.  See 26 U.S.C. § 932(c)(1)(B). 
16
 Intent is ordinarily considered a question of fact, 
where we defer to the District Court‘s determination.  See 
Peterson v. Crown Fin. Corp., 661 F.2d 287, 291 (3d Cir. 
1981).  Here, it is unclear whether the District Court made a 
factual finding as to the Ventos‘ intent to become residents.  
In its discussion section, the District Court opined that ―[t]he 
Ventos‘ testimony that they intended to become Virgin 
Islands residents by the end of 2001 is undermined by the 
objective facts.‖  VI Derivatives, LLC v. United States, 2011 
WL 703835, at *15 (D.V.I. Feb. 18, 2011).  In its findings of 
fact section, however, the District Court did not mention the 
Ventos‘ lack of intent—in fact, it found that ―[t]he Ventos 
had initially hoped the renovations could be completed in 
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 The intent to become a resident is not the intent to 
―make a fixed and permanent home.‖  Sochurek, 300 F.2d at 
38.  Rather, it is the intent to ―remain indefinitely or at least 
for a substantial period‖ in the new location.  Bergersen, 109 
F.3d at 61.  Both Richard and Lana Vento intended to become 
Virgin Islands residents as of December 31, 2001.  That intent 
is evidenced by their purchase of Estate Frydendahl and their 
ongoing business interests in the Virgin Islands.  And while 
the Ventos undoubtedly were motivated to live in the Virgin 
Islands because of its relatively favorable tax system, there is 
nothing unlawful or deceitful about choosing to reside in a 
                                                                                                             
time to move into the main house for Christmas in 2001.‖  Id. 
at *4.  Thus, we read the District Court‘s opinion as treating 
intent as an analytical construct rather than a historical fact.  
Alternatively, even if the District Court‘s intent determination 
were read as a determination of fact, its analysis of intent was 
legally erroneous for the reasons discussed in this section.  
Therefore, we may reverse it.  See Weible, 244 F.2d 158 
(finding that taxpayer was bona fide resident even though trial 
court found that taxpayer never intended to become a resident 
(reversing Weible v. United States, 1956 WL 10566 (S.D. 
Cal. Apr. 6, 1956))); see also Sochurek, 300 F.2d at 39 
(finding ―as a matter of law‖ that taxpayer was a bona fide 
resident even though trial court found that taxpayer did not 
―intend[] to reside there within the scope and intendment of 
the statute‖ (reversing Sochurek v. Comm’r, 36 T.C. 131, 139 
(1961))); cf. United States v. Lloyd, 566 F.3d 341, 344 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (explaining that reliability of hearsay 
determinations are generally reviewed for abuse of discretion, 
but are reviewed de novo if the district court‘s analysis is 
legally incorrect). 
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state or territory because of its low taxes.  Therefore, the 
District Court erred when it held that those motivations 
counseled against the Ventos‘ bona fide residency claims. 
 First, the Ventos‘ purchase and renovation of Estate 
Frydendahl shows that, by the end of 2001, they planned to 
remain in St. Thomas ―at least for a substantial period.‖  
Months before the end of 2001, the Ventos purchased Estate 
Frydendahl for $6.75 million, and began a renovation process 
that would eventually cost them another $20 million.  This 
substantial outlay, approximately three times the size of the 
tax controversy in this case, is strong evidence that the Ventos 
were not purchasing a sham property to avoid paying taxes, 
but rather that they had a bona fide intent to ―remain 
indefinitely or at least for a substantial period‖ in the Virgin 
Islands.  See Bergersen, 109 F.3d at 61 (finding that taxpayers 
claiming Puerto Rico residency ―clearly‖ demonstrated the 
requisite intent because ―they embarked on construction of a 
very expensive house in 1984, before the tax years in dispute‖ 
(emphasis omitted)).  Indeed, the United States itself argued 
at trial that the Ventos bought Estate Frydendahl ―with the 
intent of renovating it and using it as a home.‖  App. 575.  
Although the renovations took longer than expected, that does 
not defeat the Ventos‘ intent to move in by the end of 2001.  
As the District Court found, ―[t]he Ventos had initially hoped 
the renovations could be completed in time to move into the 
main house for Christmas in 2001.‖  VI Derivatives, LLC v. 
United States, 2011 WL 703835, at *4 (D.V.I. Feb. 18, 2011). 
 Second, Richard Vento‘s establishment of business 
interests in the Virgin Islands supports his claim of bona fide 
residency.  Richard formed three companies in the Virgin 
Islands in 2001: Virgin Islands Microsystems in May, Edge 
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Access in June, and VI Derivatives, LLC in August.
17
  
Although VI Derivatives has since been declared an invalid 
tax shelter, both Virgin Islands Microsystems and Edge 
Access are bona fide companies with non-tax, business 
purposes—nanotechnology research and internet access 
device manufacture, respectively.  Richard decided to found 
the companies in the Virgin Islands to take advantage of the 
Virgin Islands‘s Economic Development Program.  The 
process for applying for EDP benefits was ―quite lengthy.‖  
Ultimately, in 2002, only Virgin Islands Microsystems was 
approved to receive EDP benefits.  Richard also had 
discussions with the University of the Virgin Islands about 
collaborating to develop a physics department that would 
become a source of employees for the companies.  Richard‘s 
ambitious goals could not have been ―promptly‖ achieved in a 
―definite or specified time.‖  See Sochurek, 300 F.2d at 38.  
Thus, they support his claim of bona fide residency. 
 Finally, the Ventos‘ desire to avoid taxes does not 
undermine their claims of bona fide residency.  Under 
Sochurek, a taxpayer‘s unlawful ―tax evasion‖ motives can be 
considered evidence against bona fide residency.  See id. at 
38.  However, Sochurek did not mention lawful tax 
                                                 
17
 The District Court found that these companies were 
not ―up and running by the end of 2001.‖  VI Derivatives, 
2011 WL 703835, at *15.  However, the fact that Richard 
began establishing these companies—Edge Access was 
incorporated in the Virgin Islands in June 2001—is probative 
of his intention to remain in the Virgin Islands long-term, 
even if the companies were not yet fully operative by the end 
of 2001. 
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avoidance, and the distinction between tax evasion and tax 
avoidance is a critical one.  See id. at 34. 
 The reason tax evasion motivations are relevant under 
Sochurek is that they are probative of the taxpayer‘s ―good 
faith in making his trip abroad.‖  See id. at 38.  If a taxpayer 
does not in good faith intend to change his residency, but 
rather intends only to dupe the taxing authorities, that 
intention undermines the taxpayer‘s claim that his residency 
is bona fide.  On the other hand, a taxpayer‘s sincere desire to 
change his residency in order to take advantage of lawful tax 
incentives does not undermine his claim of bona fide 
residency.  If anything, such a motivation would support the 
taxpayer‘s intent to establish bona fide residency, which is a 
prerequisite for taking advantage of the lawful tax incentives. 
 The United States concedes that there is no evidence of 
tax evasion in this case,
18
 but argues that ―Richard Vento 
                                                 
18
 This concession first appeared in a post-trial brief 
filed in the District Court that read: ―While there is no 
evidence of tax evasion here, there is undisputed evidence 
that Richard Vento affirmatively sought to prevent the IRS 
from learning of his receipt of more than $100 million in 
income from the sale of OSI stock.‖  United States Br. 68–69 
(quoting United States Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on Residence Issue at 52, VI Derivatives, 
LLC v. United States, No. 3:06-cv-00012-JRS-RM (D.V.I. 
May 17, 2010), ECF No. 96-1).  On appeal, the United States 
repeated the concession but then reversed course, citing 
certain notes that allegedly support a tax evasion motive.  
These notes are dehors the record, however.  On November 
17, 2011, the District Court issued an order stating that the 
record consisted of documents filed prior to May 16, 2011, 
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affirmatively sought to prevent the IRS from learning of his 
receipt of more than $100 million in income from the sale of 
the OSI stock,‖ which the United States argues is ―plainly . . . 
a tax motivation that is relevant.‖  United States Br. 68–69.  
In support of its position, the United States cites Bergersen 
and Croyle to argue that ―tax motivations and activities 
falling short of ‗tax evasion‘ are relevant‖ to the residency 
analysis.  Id. at 68.  However, both cases only weakly support 
that position. 
 In Bergersen, the First Circuit acknowledged that ―[a] 
tax avoidance motive is often included in the laundry list of 
factors bearing on bona fide residency, so it is not surprising 
that the Tax Court mentioned it in passing.‖  109 F.3d at 62 
(citing Sochurek, 300 F.2d at 38).  In the very next sentence, 
however, the court stated that ―the Bergersens were perfectly 
free to consider tax advantages in moving their residence to 
Puerto Rico.‖  Id.  The court also conducted a harmless error-
like analysis: 
The Bergersens imply that the Tax Court erred 
as a matter of law by giving weight, in deciding 
the residency issue, to an alleged tax avoidance 
motive. The Tax Court made one reference to 
tax avoidance as a relevant concern (the other 
                                                                                                             
and exhibits submitted during the June 2010 bench trial.  The 
notes were submitted on November 7, 2011, in support of a 
motion for summary judgment in a case involving the Ventos‘ 
partnerships on an issue unrelated to the Ventos‘ residency.  
Because the notes are not part of the record, we may not 
consider them.  See Fassett v. Delta Kappa Epsilon (N.Y.), 
807 F.2d 1150, 1165 (3d Cir. 1986). 
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reference was to an argument by the 
government).  But in the very same passage, the 
Tax Court made clear that it was the time of the 
move to Puerto Rico, judged by objective 
factors, that was decisive. We reach the same 
result, giving no weight to the alleged motive. 
Id. (internal citation omitted and emphasis added).  Thus, 
contrary to the United States‘s position, the First Circuit in 
Bergersen expressed doubt as to whether it would be proper 
to consider tax avoidance motives and upheld the Tax Court‘s 
decision while ―giving no weight‖ to the tax avoidance 
motive.  And while Croyle found that tax avoidance motives 
could be considered in determining whether a taxpayer 
became a bona fide resident of France, it performed no 
analysis as to why that was so.  See 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 339. 
 Cutting against the position of the United States is the 
well-settled proposition that ―[t]he legal right of a taxpayer to 
decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or 
altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits, 
cannot be doubted.‖  Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 
(1935); see also Weible, 244 F.2d at 170 (―The income tax 
law has spread its tentacles into everyone‘s life, and into 
every phase of life. . . .  Humble citizen to multi-millioned 
corporation has the right to assert and take every benefit 
available.  This without stigma attached.‖).  In Gregory v. 
Helvering, the Supreme Court noted that if a transaction ―in 
reality was effected within the meaning of [the relevant 
statute], the ulterior purpose [of tax avoidance] will be 
disregarded,‖ unless ―the transaction upon its face lies outside 
the plain intent of the statute.‖  293 U.S. at 469–70.  Thus, 
under Gregory, if a transaction on its face is within the intent 
of the tax laws—in other words, if the transaction is not a 
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sham devoid of substance, see Lerman v. Comm’r, 939 F.2d 
44, 45 (3d Cir. 1991)—a taxpayer‘s legitimate tax avoidance 
motives should not be held against him. 
 Here, the District Court found that the Ventos wanted 
to move to the Virgin Islands so they ―would be able to file 
tax returns with the VIBIR and not the IRS.‖  App. 44.  But 
that is precisely what Congress intended.  The purpose of 26 
U.S.C. § 932(c) is to ―assist the [Virgin] Islands in becoming 
self-supporting‖ by ―providing for local imposition upon the 
inhabitants of the Virgin Islands of a territorial income tax, 
payable directly into the Virgin Islands treasury.‖  Dudley v. 
Comm’r, 258 F.2d 182, 185 (3d Cir. 1958).  If a taxpayer 
decides to move to the Virgin Islands because he would 
prefer to file his taxes with the VIBIR rather than the IRS, 
that taxpayer is helping the Virgin Islands become self-
supporting, so his move does not ―upon its face lie[] outside 
the plain intent of [§ 932(c)].‖  Gregory, 293 U.S. at 470. 
 The Ventos certainly decided to move to the Virgin 
Islands—Richard Vento spent $6.75 million purchasing a 
property and over $20 million improving it.
19
  In addition, he 
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 Trial counsel for the United States argued that the 
Ventos intended to make their home at Estate Frydendahl 
eventually, and the ―real question before the Court‖ was 
merely ―at what point did they make that residence their 
home‖—with the United States arguing that the point was 
―sometime in the year 2002,‖ and the Ventos arguing that it 
was in 2001.  App. 575–76.  Although the argument of 
counsel does not conclusively establish the fact that the 
Ventos desired to make Estate Frydendahl their home, it is 
probative of the fact that the Ventos‘ move was not devoid of 
 38 
 
founded two legitimate companies in the Virgin Islands.  
Thus, the Ventos‘ decision to file taxes with the VIBIR was 
consistent with the intent of § 932(c).  The Ventos were 
plainly interested in the advantages of filing their taxes with 
the VIBIR when they decided to move to the Virgin Islands.  
But using their desire to subject themselves to the mirror code 
as evidence that they did not intend to comply with it would 
be both incongruous and contrary to the Congressional 
scheme.
20
 
                                                                                                             
substance and was therefore consistent with the purpose of § 
932(c). 
20
 This is true even if, as the United States claims, the 
reason the Ventos wanted to file their taxes with the VIBIR 
was to reduce the chance that they would be penalized for 
certain tax shelter transactions.  We generally do not consider 
a taxpayer‘s reasons for seeking a tax exclusion when 
evaluating its legitimacy.  The United States is essentially 
asking us to consider how aggressively a jurisdiction applies 
its tax laws as a factor in determining whether a taxpayer‘s 
claimed residency there is bona fide.  There is no authority 
for this proposition.  Indeed, the authority is to the contrary.  
Several federal courts have found taxpayers to be bona fide 
residents of places where they were subject to no income 
taxes.  See, e.g., Sochurek, 300 F.2d at 36, 39; Scott v. United 
States, 432 F.2d 1388, 1397 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (―[I]f one is truly a 
‗resident‘ in the ordinary meaning . . . non-subjection to the 
local income tax will not throw the scale the other way.‖); 
Meals v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 658, 662 (N.D. Cal. 
1953) (―[T]he failure of an American to pay income tax to a 
foreign country in which he is living is of little significance in 
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 Unlike in Bergersen, here the District Court‘s 
consideration of the Ventos‘ tax avoidance motives was not 
harmless.  The Ventos possess significant other indicia of 
residency.  Absent consideration of their tax avoidance 
motives, those indicia demonstrate that they were bona fide 
residents of the Virgin Islands at the end of 2001. 
2. Physical Presence 
 Both the extent and nature of the Ventos‘ physical 
presence in the Virgin Islands are sufficient to support their 
claim of bona fide residency.  In assessing the amount of time 
the Ventos spent in the Virgin Islands, we must first note the 
unique statutory scheme applicable to the Virgin Islands, 
which serves to distinguish the Ventos‘ case from other cases 
in which courts have analyzed how much time a taxpayer 
spent at a claimed place of residence.  See, e.g., Bergersen, 
109 F.3d at 61–62 (taxpayers were not bona fide residents of 
Puerto Rico under 26 U.S.C. § 933 when they spent 93 days 
there compared to 138 days in Illinois); Johansson, 336 F.2d 
at 812 (taxpayer was not bona fide resident of Switzerland 
under 26 U.S.C. § 911 when he spent only 79 days there, 
compared to 120 days in Sweden and 218 in the United 
States); Sochurek, 300 F.2d at 36 (taxpayer was bona fide 
resident of Singapore under § 911 even though he spent only 
25 days a year there because he maintained his home in 
Singapore for the whole year and his absences ―were solely in 
pursuit of his broad professional assignments,‖ id. at 39). 
                                                                                                             
determining whether he is a bona fide resident there.‖); Rose 
v. Comm’r, 16 T.C. 232, 238 (1951). 
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 Both § 933, the statute governing Puerto Rico 
residency at issue in Bergersen, and § 911, the statute 
governing foreign residency generally at issue in Johansson 
and Sochurek, require that a taxpayer show that he had a bona 
fide foreign residency for an ―entire taxable year.‖  26 U.S.C. 
§ 933(1); id. § 911(d)(1)(A).  In fact, § 911 is even stricter 
because it requires that a taxpayer be a bona fide foreign 
resident for ―an uninterrupted period which includes an entire 
taxable year.‖  Id. § 911(d)(1)(A). 
 In stark contrast to those statutes, the version of § 932 
applicable to these appeals requires merely that a taxpayer be 
―a bona fide resident of the Virgin Islands at the close of the 
taxable year.‖  Id. § 932(c)(1)(A) (1986).  Under the terms of 
§ 932, a taxpayer can take advantage of its provisions even if 
he became a bona fide resident of the Virgin Islands only on 
the last day of the taxable year.  Therefore, the Ventos‘ 
presence or lack thereof in the Virgin Islands in the first part 
of 2001 sheds little light on their eligibility for § 932(c), 
which requires only that they be bona fide residents of the 
Virgin Islands at the end of 2001. 
 Examining the time period around the end of 2001, the 
evidence demonstrates that the Ventos had a sufficient 
physical presence in the Virgin Islands to support their claim 
of bona fide residency.  According to credit card records, 
Lana was present in the Virgin Islands for more than half of 
the days in December 2001, and Richard appears to have been 
there for the whole month of December 2001.  Thus, in light 
of § 932‘s mandate that we examine a taxpayer‘s status as of 
the end of the taxable year, we find that the Ventos had a 
sufficient physical presence in the Virgin Islands to weigh 
somewhat in favor of finding residency. 
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 It is true that the Ventos were away from the Virgin 
Islands for much of late 2001 and early 2002.  But substantial 
absences by themselves will not weigh against a taxpayer 
unless the ―nature‖ and ―reasons‖ for those absences suggest 
that the taxpayer‘s claimed residence was not bona fide.  In 
Sochurek, the Seventh Circuit implied that this factor did not 
weigh against a taxpayer who spent only twenty-five days a 
year in his claimed residency of Singapore when ―his 
absences from his temporary home were solely in pursuit of 
his broad professional assignments.‖  300 F.2d at 39.  The 
taxpayer in that case was a foreign correspondent whose 
occupation ―required him to travel extensively within his area 
of operations‖ to places ―from [Taiwan] to Indonesia.‖  Id. at 
36.  Because the taxpayer had legitimate reasons for his 
absences, he was still deemed a bona fide resident of 
Singapore despite being away for over 90% of the year.  See 
id. at 39. 
 Here, the Ventos‘ absences from the Virgin Islands, 
while substantial, are not suspicious because they are 
consistent with their highly mobile lifestyle.  A person may 
have multiple legal residences at the same time.  See Downs, 
166 F.2d at 508; see also Hill, 411 F.3d at 128.  Because the 
Ventos owned homes in Nevada, Utah, California, and 
Hawaii, in addition to Estate Frydendahl, they could not have 
spent a majority of the year in each place.  They traveled 
constantly among those places and elsewhere—credit card 
records show that between August 15, 2001 and November 7, 
2001, Richard paid for lodging in California, Hawaii, Florida, 
Arizona, and Texas.  During that time, he also made 
purchases in Maryland, Nevada, Virginia, California, Hawaii, 
and Utah.  Similarly, between August 18, 2001 and October 
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30, 2001, Lana made purchases in California, Hawaii, 
Nevada, and Italy. 
 In fact, the Ventos spent more time at Estate 
Frydendahl than they did at many of their other homes.  The 
District Court found that, for the first five months of 2002, 
Richard spent 35 days in St. Thomas, 23 days in San 
Francisco, and 41 days in Nevada.  Adding December 2001 
into that calculation means that Richard spent more time in 
the Virgin Islands than in Nevada for the months surrounding 
December 31, 2001.  Yet Richard was undoubtedly a bona 
fide resident of Nevada during that time. 
 Although the foreign correspondent‘s travels in 
Sochurek were required by his occupation, we see no reason 
to exalt travel for employment over other kinds of travel.  
Like the taxpayer in Sochurek, the Ventos had a consistent 
pattern of and explanation for their travel, which tends to 
negate the claim that their residency is a sham.  Thus, the 
Ventos‘ absences from the Virgin Islands, while substantial, 
weigh little, if at all, against their bona fide residency claims. 
 The nature of the Ventos‘ presence also supports their 
claims of bona fide residency because it was more consistent 
with that of a resident than a sojourner.  In May 2001, 
Richard and Lana contracted to purchase Estate Frydendahl, 
which was sold furnished, and closing occurred in August 
2001.
21
  The Ventos lived in Estate Frydendahl for parts of 
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 To be sure, Estate Frydendahl was in poor condition 
and the Ventos wanted to make significant repairs.  Richard 
testified that his wife wanted to remove everything except 
―the rock walls and the lignum vitae floor‖ and that they 
would have to ―redo all the rest‖ of Estate Frydendahl, 
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2001, including the Christmas Holiday, which they spent with 
their daughters at the Estate.  The District Court found that 
Richard spent December 2001 and 35 days in the first five 
months of 2002 in St. Thomas, and there is no evidence that 
he stayed in a hotel during that time.  While the Ventos 
wanted to make significant improvements to Estate 
Frydendahl, that desire actually supports their case because it 
shows that they had the committed physical presence that one 
would expect from a bona fide resident.  See Sochurek, 300 
F.2d at 39 (fact that taxpayer maintained a home in Singapore 
year-round supported claim of bona fide Singapore residency 
even though taxpayer was not physically present in Singapore 
year-round).  And although Estate Frydendahl was a work in 
progress at the end of 2001, it was still more of an established 
home than those possessed by other taxpayers who have been 
found to have bona fide residencies.  See, e.g., Swenson v. 
Thomas, 164 F.2d 783, 784 (5th Cir. 1947) 
(―[N]otwithstanding the fact that he established no fixed 
home in Colombia, or even a settled place of abode . . . it 
remains true that he was always living in Colombia, attending 
to his business there; and that we think constitutes residence 
there.‖). 
                                                                                                             
including the ―roof, . . . air conditioning, electricity, 
plumbing.  Everything.‖  App. 694.  Although Estate 
Frydendahl was in poor condition, it was not unlivable, and 
the District Court‘s finding to the contrary was clear error.  
The seller, Patti Birch, was living at Estate Frydendahl at the 
time it was sold to the Ventos.  In addition, ―two gentlemen 
from New York‖ and Birch‘s caretaker also lived on the 
property.  Simply stated, Estate Frydendahl was not unlivable 
in 2001 because people were living there. 
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3. Relationships 
 At the end of 2001, the Ventos‘ social ties to the 
Virgin Islands were limited.  The District Court found that 
―there is no evidence to show [the Ventos] were involved in 
community activities in the Virgin Islands or had 
‗assimilat[ed]‘ into the islands‘ culture; Richard testified the 
family joined the St. Thomas Yacht Club, but they did not 
become members until 2002.‖  VI Derivatives, 2011 WL 
703835, at *15.  The District Court reasoned that ―[t]he lack 
of community involvement during 2001 is unsurprising, given 
that Richard and Lana were rarely present in St. Thomas 
during the year.‖  Id.  This finding was not clearly erroneous. 
 Richard testified that he threw two parties at Estate 
Frydendahl—a closing party with the seller Patti Birch and a 
―football party.‖  Richard also testified that he participated in 
a fundraiser for the Yacht Club.  And Nicole Mollison 
testified that the Ventos went to Friday night dinners at the 
Yacht Club.  However, the Ventos provided no evidence of 
their social involvement apart from their own self-interested 
testimony, which the District Court was free to discredit.  See 
Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573.  This is particularly true because 
Richard‘s testimony about the ―football party‖ was vague, 
because there was no documentation about any of the Yacht 
Club events, and because the District Court found that Nicole 
had significant credibility issues.  Therefore, we agree with 
the District Court that the Ventos‘ lack of community ties 
weighs against finding bona fide residency. 
 However, community social relationships are not the 
only type of relationships that factor into the residency 
calculus—professional, marital, and family relationships 
matter as well.  In those areas, the Ventos have a stronger 
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case.  Richard began developing professional relationships in 
the Virgin Islands by having discussions with the University 
of the Virgin Islands in order to collaborate on developing a 
physics department.  The Ventos spent a significant amount 
of time with each other on St. Thomas, where they lived 
together at Estate Frydendahl.  The fact that their adult 
daughters lived elsewhere is to be expected.  Therefore, the 
Ventos‘ professional and family relationships do not 
undermine their claim of bona fide residency.  See Sochurek, 
300 F.2d at 39 (fact that taxpayer ―was unmarried with no 
dependents living elsewhere‖ suggested that his foreign 
residency was bona fide). 
4. Self-Identification 
 The Ventos self-identified as residents of the Virgin 
Islands at the end of 2001 and observed all the legal 
formalities of residency.  Richard and Lana attempted to pay 
their 2001 income taxes to the VIBIR.  In addition, they 
obtained Virgin Islands driver‘s licenses and registered to 
vote there.  Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of 
finding bona fide residency. 
*  *  * 
 Taken as a whole, the Sochurek factors indicate that 
the Ventos were bona fide residents of the Virgin Islands.  By 
the summer of 2001, they had developed the intention to live 
in the Virgin Islands ―indefinitely or at least for a substantial 
period,‖ as evidenced by their purchase of and renovation of a 
home and establishment of business interests.  See Bergersen, 
109 F.3d at 61.  They were physically present in the Virgin 
Islands for much of the period surrounding the end of 2001, 
and the nature of that presence was more consistent with what 
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would be expected of a resident as opposed to a sojourner.  
And although they did not establish many social ties in the 
community by the end of 2001, they lived together in the 
Virgin Islands and represented themselves as residents 
thereof.  For these reasons, we hold that the Ventos were bona 
fide residents of the Virgin Islands on December 31, 2001. 
C 
 Although the District Court erred in holding that 
Richard and Lana Vento were not bona fide residents of the 
Virgin Islands as of December 31, 2001, we readily agree 
with the District Court that none of the Vento daughters was a 
bona fide resident at that time. 
 Applying the Sochurek factors to Nicole Mollison, it is 
clear that she did not intend to become a Virgin Islands 
resident by the end of 2001.  Nicole never established a home 
in the Virgin Islands, even as she hired contractors to remodel 
her Nevada home in 2000, 2001, and 2002.  Nor did she 
establish a profession in the Virgin Islands—she studied to 
become a teacher in Nevada and eventually became licensed 
to teach in Nevada and California, but not in the Virgin 
Islands.  Nicole‘s only evidence of intent was her own self-
serving testimony, which the District Court found not credible 
because of her ―evasive demeanor on cross-examination, her 
family‘s continuing ties to Nevada . . . , and the lack of safe 
and comfortable accommodations for the Mollison family at 
[Estate Frydendahl].‖  See VI Derivatives, 2011 WL 703835, 
at *10 n.38.  We defer to these credibility determinations, 
which are the province of the factfinder.  See Anderson, 470 
U.S. at 573. 
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 Likewise, Nicole did not have a sufficient physical 
presence in the Virgin Islands.  She visited there only three 
times during 2001, each time engaging in ―tourist activities.‖  
Nicole did not move any personal property to St. Thomas and 
was not even physically present on December 31, 2001, 
having returned to Nevada the day after Christmas. 
 Third, Nicole‘s ties and relationships mostly remained 
with the mainland.  From 2000 until at least 2003, all of 
Nicole‘s children attended school in Nevada.  Her husband, 
from whom she was never separated, lived in Nevada and 
listed a Nevada address on his 2001 tax return. 
 Finally, Nicole never identified herself as a resident of 
the Virgin Islands.  Although she filed tax returns with the 
VIBIR in 2001, she never obtained a Virgin Islands driver‘s 
license.  During her 2003 adoption proceeding, Nicole swore 
under oath that she was a resident of Nevada, and that she 
resided there continuously since 1995.  Nicole never told the 
Nevada court or social worker that she had a Virgin Islands 
residency. 
 Likewise, Gail Vento was not a bona fide resident of 
the Virgin Islands at the end of 2001.  Gail did not intend to 
become a Virgin Islands resident by the end of 2001—she did 
not establish a home in the Virgin Islands by the end of 2001 
but rather lived in her own house in Colorado.  Gail herself 
testified that she moved to the Virgin Islands in 2002. 
 Gail also had a minimal physical presence in the 
Virgin Islands.  She visited St. Thomas only twice in 2001—
for the family cruise in March and for the Christmas party, 
during which she stayed in a bedroom in the main house at 
Estate Frydendahl and engaged in ―tourist-type activities.‖  
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She brought no personal property other than clothing to the 
Virgin Islands.  Although Gail was physically present at 
Estate Frydendahl on December 31, 2001, she was not there 
as a resident but rather as a vacationer and guest of her 
parents. 
 Gail‘s primary professional and family ties also 
remained with the mainland—from 1998 until December 
2002, she was enrolled as a full-time student at the University 
of Colorado.  Her boyfriend, whom she has since married, 
also lived with her in Colorado at the end of 2001.  Although 
Gail filed her 2001 tax returns with the VIBIR, she had not, 
as of December 31, 2001, observed other formalities of 
residency such as obtaining a Virgin Islands driver‘s license 
or registering to vote there.  
 Like her sisters, Renee was not a bona fide resident of 
the Virgin Islands at the end of 2001.  She visited the Virgin 
Islands only three times that year—once after she graduated 
from college, once in September, and once for the Christmas 
party.  Renee stayed at a hotel during her first visit and at 
Estate Frydendahl during her second and third visits.  The 
only personal property she had in the Virgin Islands were 
―easily movable items,‖ such as clothing, cameras, and a 
laptop.  Although Renee was physically present at Estate 
Frydendahl on December 31, 2001, she was there as a 
vacationer and guest of her parents, not as a resident. 
Meanwhile, most of Renee‘s ties remained with the 
mainland.  From the summer of 2001 until the spring of 2002, 
Renee was employed in her family‘s home office in Nevada 
while living at Lake Tahoe.  In January 2002, she applied to a 
photography school in California, listing her address as a post 
office box in Nevada.  Renee enrolled in the photography 
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school in 2002 and lived in California.  Although she filed her 
2001 taxes with the VIBIR, Renee had not obtained a Virgin 
Islands driver‘s license, voter registration, or bank account by 
the end of 2001. 
 The Taxpayers argue, somewhat in passing, that the 
residency of the Vento daughters follows that of their parents.  
They cite no authority for this proposition, and we are 
unaware of any.  In fact, § 932(c) requires that each 
―individual‖ taking advantage of the statute either be ―a bona 
fide resident of the Virgin Islands‖ or ―file[] a joint return‖ 
with a bona fide Virgin Islands resident.  26 U.S.C. § 932(c).  
All three adult daughters filed their own tax returns, and none 
was a dependent of their parents.  Because the daughters were 
not themselves bona fide residents of the Virgin Islands at the 
end of 2001 and did not file joint tax returns with their 
parents, their 2001 taxes were due to the United States. 
V 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court‘s judgment with respect to Richard and Lana Vento and 
hold that they were bona fide residents of the Virgin Islands 
on December 31, 2001.  We will affirm the District Court‘s 
judgment that Nicole Mollison, Gail Vento, and Renee Vento 
were not bona fide residents of the Virgin Islands on 
December 31, 2001.
22
 
                                                 
22
 The District Court made no findings with respect to 
the Vento partnerships.  Because those partnerships are pass-
through entities, see Historic Boardwalk Hall, 694 F.3d at 
429 n.1, they do not have residencies separate from their 
owners. 
